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In the closing article, I will offer a twofold argument. First, despite all its
shortcomings, the 1989 coordinated regime change is a unique success story in the
region. It resulted in revolutionary changes in the constitutional system. Second,
there is a need again for a peaceful, revolutionary establishment of legitimate
government, but without a revolution as such.
On 23 November 1989, Václav Havel met Timothy Garton Ash in a Prague pub.
During that conversation, the Englishman famously remarked: “In Poland, it
took ten years, in Hungary ten months, in East Germany ten weeks; perhaps in
Czechoslovakia, it will take ten days!” Havel gave his quick reaction: “It would be
fabulous because a revolution is too exhausting.” Although Ash did not do justice to
the efforts of the East-Central European democratic opposition movements beyond
Poland, his quip pointed to both similarities and dissimilarities of the regime change
in the respective countries.
The 1989 East-Central European round tables were similar in the procedural sense.
They were meant to regulate the transition from the old regime to a new one, but
they did not have a mandate for constitution-making. The opposition movements
were very aware of the legitimacy problem. They had neither the formal authorization
to make law for the old regime nor the popular authorization to make law for the new
regime. The round tables, therefore, understood their task as limited to facilitating the
run-up to free, competitive elections and were determined to leave it to an elected
assembly to give a constitution to the new regime. In order for the round table
decisions to come into legal effect, those decisions need to be sent for enactment to
the old — formally legal but illegitimate — legislature.
Under normal circumstances, in a constitutional democracy, the legislative assembly
embodies political pluralism, deliberation, and democratic decision making under the
rule of law. Under certain exceptional circumstances, when no legitimate legislative
assembly is available, a round table can be a temporary institution of pluralism,
symbolizing equal participatory rights. By contrast, we can speak of revolution when
the following conditions are in place: first, when empirical legitimacy is in crisis,
second, legality is also ruptured, and third, the open struggle of two or more political
forces to establish a new governmental system culminates in violence. Revolution
thus presupposes the existence of uncompromising despotism and resistance
movements. In 1989, there was no revolutionary moment. By that time, the Soviet-
type autocracy had been immensely weakened, and the reformist incumbents were
willing to cooperate with the democratic opposition.
Nevertheless, it would be an error to simply treat the round table as an elitist
procedural solution. It is not clear in what sense members of democratic opposition
belonged to an elite. Many of them were imprisoned, kept under surveillance, or
forced by the repressive regimes to work underground. Moreover, it is not apparent
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why should we downplay the importance of the series of mass demonstrations
in Warsaw, Budapest and elsewhere in 1989 and before. If we accept the simple
duality of elite-driven versus mass-driven transformations, we may fall into the trap
set up by populist authoritarians who deny the achievement of the coordinated
regime change.
The round table thus can be regarded as an exceptional procedural device in a set
of circumstances that are far from constitutional democracy or revolution. In 1989,
round tables started a coordinated process of constitutional change, but left the
completion of the process to an assembly with the democratic mandate they were
lacking. In short, a round table is a non-ideal institution in sub-ideal situations.
Round tables have shared characteristics in the substantive sense, too. In a time
when skeptical views on the 1989 regime change are gaining remarkable popularity
and the shortcomings of the change are being brought into focus; it is crucial
to remember the outcomes of that Annus mirabilis. The negotiations between
undemocratic power holders and the opposition were significant contributors to
the replacement of Soviet-type regimes by constitutional democracy. The Soviet-
type regimes took different forms: it was a single-party system in Hungary and a
dominant-party system in Czechoslovakia and Poland, they ultimately did not differ
each other. There were no free and fair competitive elections. Although constitutions
formally declared fundamental rights, these were not legally enforceable. The
constitutional structures did not ensure the independence of the judiciary or
the press. Moreover, non-governmental organizations, democratic opposition
groups, and some churches were forced to work underground. By contrast, the
constitutional democracies that emerged in 1989 possessed the main institutions
of constitutionalism: democratic pluralism and multi-party system, free and fair
elections, representative government, independent judiciary. As a crucial element,
the third generation of European constitutional courts started to work from the early
1990s. These courts were considered the most important institutional guarantors of
constitutionalism, especially in the first, formative years, on account of their decisions
favoring human rights, the principles of the rule of law and separation of powers.
We can thus say that the East-Central European autocratic systems did not collapse
due to a classical revolution, but through negotiations and compromises between the
old regime and the democratic opposition. However, the political transition did result
in revolutionary changes in the constitutional system and did so without a revolution
as such. Despite all its shortcomings, it is a unique success story in the region.
Timothy Garton Ash referred to the dynamic character of the system transformation,
which may highlight crucial differences among the countries. In the abstract, the
negotiation was a process led not by the common interests of the parties, but by
a clash of values and interests. Uneasy compromises with members of the ancien
régime were an unavoidable part of the negotiated regime change. We can say
that the demand to reach compromises is one of the most important underlying
characteristics of peaceful transitions. However, the story of the 1989 round tables
demonstrates that time mattered a lot.
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In April 1989, when the round table agreement was signed in Poland, there was little
indication of the total collapse of the Soviet system and the fall of the Berlin Wall on
the horizon. A well-known example of a necessary compromise is that in the first
Polish elections, 65% of the seats in Sejm were reserved for the Communist Party
and its satellite parties. Moreover, the position of head of state was also shaped to
suit their expectations.
Nevertheless, the political environment changed dynamically, rendering it
unnecessary to make concessions. In October 1989, the Hungarian opposition was
forced to make much smaller compromises due to the rapid changes. And when one
part of the opposition engaged in an unnecessary compromise, allowing the position
of head of state to be secured by a moderate communist leader, another part of the
opposition successfully initiated a referendum correcting the roundtable agreement
and paving the way for democratic presidential elections.
The round tables in Berlin and Prague are a different story. They were instances not
so much of mutual concessions but of the capitulation of the communist side. The
representatives of democratic movements were not compelled to make significant
compromises.
Thirty years after the democratic transition, the Visegrád countries are in great
difficulty or danger. Hungary today can be seen as the prototype of a new form
of authoritarianism. The most salient new feature is that the new authoritarian
configuration systematically pretends to abide by constitutional and democratic
principles. Although the situation in Poland is less critical than the one in Hungary,
we can agree with Wojciech Sadurski’s description of the transformation as an anti-
constitutional populist backsliding. In Prague, hundreds of thousands attended a
mass rally demanding transparency, democratic accountability, and the rule of law
on the eve of the 30th anniversary of the Velvet Revolution. Likewise, Slovakia is
not immune to the creep of authoritarian ideas and practices either, as the Me#iar-
and Fico-governments demonstrated. Different degrees of decay, of course, require
different considerations.
The only Visegrád country that needs a regime change, a transition again from
authoritarianism to constitutional democracy, is Hungary. Without predicting the
preconditions, procedures, or outcomes of a new democratic reconstruction in
Hungary and elsewhere, I would like to bring the old concept of the “Glorious
Revolution” into a new light.
Our contemporary concept of revolution goes back to Condorcet, who argued
famously that revolution—radical, quick, progressive, often violent regime
change—aims at freedom. Revolution is, of course, an empirical phenomenon.
Revolutionaries believe that in the age of revolution when despotism is unbearable,
the spirit of liberty flames in the hearts of men and women.
The word “revolution” meant originally the very opposite. As a term of astronomy,
revolution designated the regular recurring motion of celestial bodies. Hannah
Arendt explains that we find the word “revolution” for the first time as a political
term in the seventeenth century when its metaphoric content was closer to the
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original meaning because it was used for a movement of revolving back to some
pre-established point. The word was first used not for Cromwell’s revolutionary
dictatorship, but on the contrary, for the restoration of the monarchy. As a next step,
the phrase “Glorious Revolution” of 1688 meant not so much a restoration of the
absolute monarchy, but rather the establishment of constitutional monarchy. The
new king and queen signed the Bill of Rights, acknowledging crucial constitutional
principles, including the right to free elections, the right to elect regular parliaments,
and freedom of speech. For this reason, the Glorious Revolution is considered to be
one of the most significant events leading to Britain’s transformation from absolutism
to modern constitutionalism.
Something similar is what Hungary desperately needs — a peaceful, revolutionary
re-establishment of legitimate government and constitutional democracy under the
rule of law, but without a revolution as such. What Hungary needs is not merely
the restoration of constitutional democracy to its 1989 original form, but instead a
restoration of constitutional democracy in an advanced form.
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